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Desperate times call for desperate measures.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, it was estimated that 565,650 Americans would die of 
cancer, accounting for one of every four deaths in the United States.2  
Doctors expected to diagnose 1,437,180 new patients with cancer 
throughout 2008, bringing the U.S. cancer population to over ten 
million.3  While many of the cancers diagnosed are curable or man-
ageable, others continue to remain deadly.  These terminally ill pa-
tients are left desperate and willing to try just about anything regard-
less of the possibility of a cure or relief.  Patients who believe they 
have nothing to lose have demanded faster turnaround of approval of 
drug treatment options, forcing the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and the drug approval process into the spotlight.  Particularly, 
these patients challenge the balance the government maintains be-
tween consumer protection and access to experimental treatments 
for terminally ill patients for whom no options exist.  Some cancer 
organizations—representing members with personal and devastating 
stories about their loved ones’ struggle with cancer—have tried to 
sway the power away from the FDA by attempting to tip the balance 
between safety and efficacy in favor of providing the right of termi-
 ∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2002, 
Georgetown University.  The author would like to thank Dean Boozang for her in-
valuable guidance throughout the writing process. 
 1 A translation of the Latin proverb “extremis malis extrema remedia” or “ex-
treme remedies for extreme ills.” 
 2 AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2008, at 2 (2008), available 
at http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/2008CAFFfinalsecured.pdf. 
 3 Id. at 1. 
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nally ill patients to access experimental drugs.  At the same time, a 
year of embarrassments involving such controversial medications as 
Vioxx has subjected the FDA to severe criticism about whether it is 
sufficiently protecting the public from dangerous drugs.4  This clash 
of patient autonomy and consumer protection came to a head in a 
lawsuit filed by Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs (Alliance), which sought access for the terminally ill to post–
Phase I experimental drugs. 
In August 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, sitting en banc, vacated the prior panel’s decision 
in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschen-
bach, which decreed that terminally ill patients had a fundamental 
constitutional right to access experimental drugs that had only been 
through Phase I testing.5  Prior to the en banc ruling, the panel had 
ruled that patients could have access to drugs tested solely for safety, 
with no evidence of efficacy.6  In what appeared to be a huge defeat 
in increasing experimental intervention options for dying patients, 
Alliance was not deterred and filed a petition for writ of certiorari in 
the Supreme Court of the United States.7 
In January 2008, the Supreme Court denied Alliance’s petition 
for writ of certiorari refusing to weigh in on where the balance 
should be struck between patients’ rights and consumer protection.8  
While Alliance considers its next move—to pursue its cause in an-
 4 Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go from Here: Hearing of the Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 3–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy). 
 5 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. de-
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).  Numerous amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of 
both parties to the litigation.  For the government, the following parties filed briefs: 
American Society of Clinical Oncology; National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship; 
Association of American Medical Colleges; National Organization for Rare Disorders; 
AIDS Action Baltimore; United Leukodystrophy Foundation; Neurofibromatosis, 
Inc.; Kennedy’s Disease Association; National Ataxia Foundation; and the National 
Alopecia Areata Foundation.  See D.C. Court of Appeals Docket, Abigail Alliance for 
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (No. 04-5350).  For Alliance, the following individuals filed briefs:  economists 
including John Calfee, Daniel Klein, Sam Peltzman, Alex Tabarrok, and Benjamin 
Zycher; Dr. Emil Freireich from The University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Cen-
ter; and Dr. Stephen Strum.  Id. 
 6 Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486. 
 7 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. 
Sept. 28, 2008) (No. 07-444). 
 8 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
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other federal jurisdiction—the question left unanswered is whether 
all of this litigation will be productive in accomplishing Alliance’s 
goal of increasing access to experimental drugs.  The gaping hole in 
Alliance’s strategy is how patients will obtain experimental drugs.  Pa-
tients cannot compel pharmaceutical companies, which are non-state 
actors, to fulfill such a right.  Therefore, Alliance presumably expects 
drug companies to voluntarily sell these experimental substances.  
However, this Comment proceeds on the presumption that drug 
companies will be unwilling to provide experimental drugs due to the 
cost, ethical concerns, practical infeasibilities, and potential tort 
claim liability. 
This Comment proposes that the resources of the Court should 
not be consumed with deciding whether there is a fundamental right 
to access experimental drugs.  Such a decision will prove futile be-
cause the result will not increase access to experimental drugs for the 
terminally ill.  Ultimately, this Comment argues that the success of 
providing increased access to experimental drugs—regardless of 
changes implemented by Congress, the judiciary, or the FDA’s regu-
lations—will depend on the participation of the drug companies; 
more specifically, success will depend on tailoring a program to offer 
adequate incentives to drug manufacturers while not sacrificing pa-
tients’ rights.  Part II traces the history of the FDA drug approval 
process.  Part III examines the Abigail Alliance organization and the 
procedural history of its litigation.  Part IV evaluates the claim that Al-
liance’s litigation was and will continue to be futile because the 
pharmaceutical companies will remain unwilling to provide medica-
tion voluntarily in light of their legal, financial, and ethical con-
straints.  Part V analyzes the proposed congressional legislation and 
FDA regulation addressing Alliance’s demands.  Part VI suggests that 
the FDA’s regulatory proposal offers the most promising compromise 
for Alliance, provided the amendments can be adapted to include in-
centives for drug company participation in expanded access pro-
grams. 
II. HISTORY OF THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS 
A. Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906 
Drug-related public health problems evoked support for a uni-
form national regulation of the drug market, prompting Congress to 
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pass the Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906 (“1906 Act”).9  The 1906 
Act was aimed at banning both the manufacture and distribution of 
“adulterated and misbranded” drugs.10  While the 1906 Act allowed 
the government to seize non-conforming drugs and prosecute of-
fenders, the law was circumscribed in its focus to ensure that drugs 
adhered to a prescribed standard of strength, quality, or purity; and 
that a drug’s label accurately complied with the contents of the pack-
age.11  Essentially, the 1906 Act centered on making misrepresenta-
tion illegal, which satisfy customer expectations by guaranteeing that 
drugs were what they claimed to be.12  To this end, the 1906 Act was 
amended in 1912 to expand the notion of “misbranding” to also in-
clude false and misleading statements on labels as to the curative or 
remedial effects of drugs.13  Importantly, the 1906 Act lacked any 
evaluation of the safety or effectiveness of new drugs entering the 
market.14  The implications of this shortfall became apparent in 1937 
when over 100 people died after ingesting a new antibiotic, Elixir Sul-
fanilamide, which unbeknownst to the public, was the equivalent of 
antifreeze.15  In reaction to the public outcry over this tragedy, Con-
gress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938,16 
 9 Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), re-
pealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)); PETER HUTT ET AL., 
FOOD AND DRUG LAW 9 (3d ed. 2007).  Uniform national regulation was strongly sup-
ported because the multitude of varying state statutes caused mischief, confusion, 
and embarrassment.  HUTT, supra, at 9.  A national tragedy—the distribution of teta-
nus infected diphtheria antitoxins which led to the death of several children—
assisted in pushing the need for national regulation of the food and drug supply to 
the forefront of concerns.  Id. 
 10 Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, § 1.  Under the 1906 Act, a drug was found 
adulterated when it differed from the established standard of strength, quality, or 
purity and if its strength or purity was below the professed standard or quality under 
which it was sold.  Id. § 7.  Additionally, according to the 1906 Act, a drug was mis-
branded if it was an imitation of a drug or offered for sale under the name of an-
other drug, if the contents of the package had been removed and replaced with 
other drugs, or if the packaging failed to have a statement of the quantity of a long 
list of substances including alcohol, heroin, and chloroform.  Id. § 8. 
 11 Id. §§ 7–8, 11. 
 12 Id. §§ 7–8. 
 13 Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, amended by 37 Stat. 416 (1912).  See United 
States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911) (holding that false and misleading statements 
on labels referring to curative or remedial effects of the drug were not considered 
misbranding under the 1906 Act). 
 14 Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, §§ 1–13. 
 15 PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
42–43 (1980). 
 16 FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)). 
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which set the stage for modern-day drug regulation by shifting atten-
tion to the safety of drugs before distribution to the market.17 
B. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
Embarking on a new era of drug regulation, the FDCA required 
manufacturers of all “new drugs”18 to file a new drug application 
(NDA) with the FDA including the appropriate scientific and medical 
data supporting the drug’s safety.19  Once all information was filed, 
the FDA had sixty days to determine if the drug was unsafe.20  If this 
deadline passed without any FDA contact, the drug was automatically 
“approved” for manufacturing and distribution.21  If a manufacturer 
was put on notice by the FDA within the sixty-day time period, the 
FDA placed the new drug application on hold for up to 180 days in 
order to further study and investigate the drug and the application.22  
All applicants received an opportunity for a hearing with the FDA to 
establish the adequacy of their reports on the drug’s safety.23  After 
such due process, the FDA suspended all applications which failed to 
effectively show the new drug was safe for distribution under the 
conditions of use upon which the application was based.24  Hence, 
the 1938 version of the FDCA expanded the FDA’s ability to regulate 
new drug manufacturing and distribution based on safety.25  How-
ever, the FDCA lacked a requirement for “affirmative” pre-market 
 17 Id. 
 18 FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2000)).  A “new drug” under the 1938 FDCA was defined as 
Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is not 
generally recognized, among experts . . . as safe and effective for use 
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested . . . [or] 
any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug, as a re-
sult of investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use 
under such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not, 
otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent or 
for a material time under such conditions. 
Id. 
 19 FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(1)(2000)).  The FDCA of 1938 required that a full report of the 
investigations on a drug’s safety be submitted including a full list of the components 
of the drug, full description of the method used in manufacturing and packing the 
drug, and samples of the drug and the proposed labeling.  Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(1)(2000)). 
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approval by the FDA for new drugs because NDAs were deemed ap-
proved after a sixty-day time period unless steps were taken to reject 
the application and prove the drug wa
C. Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 
Congress dramatically revised the FDA approval process with the 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 (“1962 Amendments”) to re-
quire that new drugs receive pre-market approval from the FDA 
based on safety and effectiveness.27  The 1962 Amendments were trig-
gered by America’s “close call” with the drug Thalidomide in the 
1950s.28 
1. The Thalidomide Tragedy 
Thalidomide was developed in Germany and became widely 
used by the late 1950s in Europe as a morning sickness medication 
for pregnant women.29  In September 1960, Richardson-Merrell Inc., 
which signed a contract to sell Thalidomide in the United States, ap-
plied for FDA approval of the new drug.30  According to the FDCA of 
1938, the FDA had only sixty days to review the company’s drug ap-
plication before the drug would be automatically approved for distri-
bution,31 leaving plenty of time for Richardson-Merrell to meet its 
1961 target distribution date.32  A year and a half prior to Merrell’s 
submission of its NDA, the company began distributing Thalidomide 
for investigational use in clinical trials.33  Merrell dispersed nearly 
2,500,000 tablets to nearly 20,000 patients—including 624 pregnant 
women—while the drug was awaiting FDA approval.34 
By the early 1960s, Thalidomide had been strongly linked to a 
rare birth defect in Europe called phocomelia—a shortening and de-
 26 Id. 
 27 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–381 (2000)). 
 28 108 CONG. REC. H21058 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962) (statement of Rep. Sullivan 
acknowledging that without the media coverage on Thalidomide and Dr. Frances 
Kelsey from the FDA there might never have been any changes to the FDCA). 
 29 Sue McGrath, Only a Matter of Time: Lessons Unlearned at the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Keep Americans at Risk, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 603, 606–07 (2005). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See supra text accompanying notes 20–22. 
 32 McGrath, supra note 29, at 607. 
 33 Id. at 608. 
 34 Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass 
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 314 (1992). 
OCHS (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:21:59 PM 
2009] COMMENT 565 
 
formity of the limbs resembling the extremities of a seal.35  Mothers 
who had taken Thalidomide in West Germany bore between 3500 
and 5000 babies afflicted with phocomelia in 1962 alone—prior to 
this, physicians rarely diagnosed a single case in an entire career.36  
Fortunately and largely by chance, the United States, in comparison 
to many parts of the world where Thalidomide had been distributed, 
largely escaped this tragedy due to Dr. Frances Kelsey at the FDA.37  
After reviewing Merrell’s application, Dr. Kelsey found deficiencies in 
its studies and on the fifty-eighth day, two days before the drug would 
have been automatically approved for sale, placed the Thalidomide 
application on hold.38  The application was subsequently postponed 
numerous times, and in March 1962 Merrell withdrew its applica-
tion.39  All in all, Thalidomide caused 10,000 children in forty-six 
countries to be born with deformities; only seventeen were born in 
America.40 
2. The Aftermath of Thalidomide: The Passage of the 
1962 Amendments 
While prior attempts to reform the 1938 FDCA had been unsuc-
cessful, the “close call” with Thalidomide forced the government to 
re-evaluate the drug approval process and specifically to examine the 
FDA’s limited authority to prevent pervasive use of an unproven, in-
sidious drug.41  Hence, Congress enacted the 1962 Amendments and 
replaced the pre-market notification system with pre-market approval 
both for safety and effectiveness for all new drugs.42  These changes 
converted the FDA’s role to a proactive participant acting as a con-
sumer protection watchdog in the drug approval process.43 
 35 108 CONG. REC. H21058–59 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962) (statement of Rep. Sulli-
van quoting a report from the Associated Press). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 21072 (statement of Rep. Yates). 
 38 McGrath, supra note 29, at 608; Linda Bren, Frances Oldham Kelsey: FDA Medical 
Reviewer Leaves Her Mark on History, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 24, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2001/201_kelsey.html (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2008). 
 39 McGrath, supra note 29, at 608. 
 40 Bren, supra note 38. 
 41 See 108 CONG. REC. H21070 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962) (statement of Rep. 
Reuss). 
 42 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–381(2000)); see 108 CONG. REC. H21058–73 
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962). 
 43 See TEMIN, supra note 15, at 125. 
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The 1962 Amendments control today’s drug approval process.  
Manufacturers must obtain pre-market FDA approval by submitting 
for review to the FDA sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness of 
any new drug.44  The FDA also exercises authority over new drug pre-
approval events, especially clinical trials involving humans.45  Addi-
tionally, the FDA has post-market jurisdiction over safety, advertise-
ments, and promotions.46 
D. Current Drug Approval Procedure 
The process for drug approval is complicated, time-consuming, 
and expensive.  Before even submitting a new drug application, a 
manufacturer must conduct clinical studies designed to show the 
drug is both safe and effective.47  The process begins with an investi-
gational new drug (IND) application to commence clinical testing on 
humans.48  These IND applications generally follow pre-clinical test-
ing on animals to get initial projections on safety that takes about 3.5 
years.49  Pre-approval testing on humans involves three separate phas-
es of investigative studies.50 
1. Phase I Testing 
Phase I testing entails the initial introduction of the experimen-
tal drug in humans51 and usually lasts about a year,52 involving be-
tween twenty and eighty healthy volunteers.53  The studies seek “to 
determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drugs in 
humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if pos-
sible, to gain early evidence of effectiveness.”54  Essentially, Phase I 
tests are designed to study metabolism and toxicity, but these tests 
provide only preliminary information on safety and possibly no in-
formation regarding efficacy.55  It is important not to accord more 
 44 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). 
 45 Id. § 355(b)(5). 
 46 See id. § 355(e), § 352(n); 21 C.F.R. 202.1 (2007). 
 47 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and “Privatization”—The Drug Approval Proc-
ess, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 203, 212 (1995). 
 50 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2007). 
 51 Id. § 312.21(a)(1). 
 52 Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213. 
 53 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Susan Okie, Access Before Approval—A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?, 355 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 437, 438 (2006). 
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weight than is appropriate to the results of a Phase I study; Phase I 
studies are basically assuring that a new drug does not poison a sub-
ject.56  Phase I is usually the safest phase for human testing because it 
involves healthy volunteer subjects, low doses, and close medical su-
pervision.57  However, disasters do happen.  Recent Phase I trials re-
sulted in one death and six serious adverse effects.58  The Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), which oversees testing under 
the FDCA, can place a study on a clinical hold if it has concerns over 
safety or a sponsor’s insufficient risk disclosure.59 
2. Phase II Testing 
Phase II testing increases the controlled trial group to several 
hundred subjects and is meant to evaluate “the effectiveness of the 
drug for a particular indication in patients with the disease or condi-
tion under study and to determine the common short-term side ef-
fects and risks associated with the drug.”60  Phase II clinics can last 
about two years.61  The FDA requires that these trials be adequate and 
well controlled studies which allow identification of the effects of the 
drug to be shown from other influences other than the specific 
chemicals that are being tested.62  As such, most clinical trials involve 
comparisons to control groups that receive placebos or the current 
best treatment, randomized assignment to treatment, and blinded 
outcome assessment.63  Because study participants have the possibility 
of either unknowingly receiving the experimental drug or a placebo, 
and because the drug being tested has not yet been proven effec-
tive,64 a critical distinction for all participants in clinical trials must be 
 56 Rita Rubin, Unapproved Drugs Ignite Life-and-Death Debate; Lawsuit Pits Desperately 
Ill Against Hard Bureaucratic Realities, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2007, at 1A (quoting Bio-
Ethicist Arthur Caplan from the University of Pennsylvania). 
 57 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1). 
 58 See generally S.E. Raper et al., Fatal Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome in an 
Orinthine Transcarbanylase Deficient Patient Following Adenoviral Gene Transfer, 80 
MOLECULAR GENETICS METABOLISM 148 (2003) (discussing the death of Jesse Gelsin-
ger); Ganesh Suntharalingam et al., Cytokine Storm in a Phase I Trial of the Anti-CD28 
Monoclonal Antibody TGN1412, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1018 (2006) (serious adverse re-
actions on six healthy patients). 
 59 The CDER Handbook, The New Development and Review Process: Phase I 
Clinical Studies, http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/phase1.htm (last visited Sept. 
3, 2008). 
 60 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b). 
 61 Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213. 
 62 P.P. De Deyn & R. D’Hooge, Placebos in Clinical Practice and Research, 22 J. MED. 
ETHICS 140, 140–41 (1996). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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made indicating that their involvement in the trial is not experimen-
tal therapy but an experimental study.65  Phase II studies are not 
meant to treat but are intended solely to evaluate whether the sub-
stances at issue offer therapeutic benefits.66  Physicians must follow 
protocol, from which they may not deviate even if they believe it is in 
the participant’s best medical interest.67  Participants are conse-
quently referred to as subjects instead of patients to solidify this dis-
tinction.68  However, despite this distinction, most subjects are moti-
vated to join clinical trials due to the recruitment efforts of their 
physician,69 hope for personal benefit, and lack of alternative options 
for their own
To become a participant in Phase II trials, patients must satisfy 
specific eligibility criteria.71  These may include a particular age, gen-
der, medical history, current health status, and type or stage of dis-
ease.72  These initial trials do not involve participation by minors; 
however, the FDA mandates that sponsors must incorporate children 
in testing if the drug is specifically marketed for children.73  Addi-
tionally, clinical trials usually take place at cancer centers, medical 
centers, community hospitals, specialized centers, and doctors’ of-
fices,74 possibly requiring subjects to travel great lengths to partici-
pate.  All research involving human subjects is governed by federal 
 65 Frances H. Miller, Symposium Trust Relationships Part 1 of 2: Trusting Doctors: 
Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423, 433 (2001). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 There exists the possibility for a conflict of interest between a physician and his 
referral to his patient to enter a clinical study when the physician is being compen-
sated by a sponsor with the receipt of “finder’s fees.”  Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with 
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abo-
litionist Approach, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 379, 381–82 (2000).  Additionally, a recent 
trend in clinical research has been the shift from research of investigators at aca-
demic medical centers to private physicians running and directing research as a phy-
sician-investigator.  Jason E. Klein & Alan R. Fleischman, The Private Practicing Physi-
cian-Investigator: Ethical Implications of Clinical Research in the Office Setting, 32 HASTING 
CTR. RPT., July–Aug. 2002, at 22–24.  This new dual role of physicians creates conflicts 
of interests between the physician and his patients when sponsors are compensating 
the physician to recruit, retain, and study research subjects.  Id. 
 70 Nancy Kass et al., Trust: The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Re-
search, 26 HASTING CTR. REP. 25, 26 (1996). 
 71 Nat’l Cancer Inst., Clinical Trials Questions and Answers, http://www.cancer. 
gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Information/clinical-trials (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 72 Id. 
 73 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2007). 
 74 Nat’l Cancer Inst., supra note 71. 
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law and is subject to Institutional Board Review75 (IRB) approval.76  
IRBs perform the initial review of the clinical research program—
including approval of research protocol, informed consent, and ad-
vertisements—and oversee the clinical trial in progress to evaluate 
the on-going degree of risk.
3. Phase III Testing 
Phase III testing attempts “to gather information about effec-
tiveness and safety needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk rela-
tionship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician 
labeling.”78  The size of the group is drastically expanded to several 
hundred or several thousand subjects.79  Phase III includes both con-
trolled and uncontrolled testing.80  This means subjects in a Phase III 
trial could be subject to two scenarios: a controlled setting, where 
there is a possibility of receiving the experimental drug or placebo, or 
an uncontrolled setting, where all subjects receive the experimental 
drug and there is no comparison control group.81  While random-
ized, controlled trials are considered the gold standard in drug 
evaluation,82 the allowance of both types of studies permits broader 
participation in the trial.  Many cancer subjects cite the trial’s design 
and use of randomized placebo control groups as the main reason for 
refusal to participate in the study.83  Similarly to Phase II, subjects 
must meet certain qualifications to participate.84  Phase III testing 
lasts about three yea
 75 Institutional Review Boards are required to have at least five members with va-
rying backgrounds and diversity.  45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2007).  To form an adequate 
IRB, at least one member must have primary scientific concerns, at least one member 
must have primary non-scientific concerns, and at least one member must not be af-
filiated with the institution.  Id.  No IRB member may have a conflict of interests in 
reviewing a sponsor’s program.  Id.  In order to gain approval from an IRB, a quo-
rum is needed to vote which includes at least one member whose primary concern is 
not in a scientific area.  45 C.F.R. § 46.108 (2007). 
 76 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101, 46.109 (2007). 
 77 45 C.F.R. § 46.109. 
 78 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2007). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 De Deyn & D’Hooge, supra note 62, at 140–42. 
 82 Katie Featherstone & Jenny L. Donovan, “Why Don’t They Just Tell Me Straight, 
Why Allocate It?” The Struggle To Make Sense of Participating in Randomised Controlled Tri-
al, 55 SOC. SCI. & MED. 709, 709 (2002). 
 83 Priscilla Alderson, Equipoise as a Means of Managing Uncertainty: Personal, Com-
munal and Proxy, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 135, 138 (1996). 
 84 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 85 Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213. 
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4. Post-Phase Testing Procedure 
At the completion of all testing phases, the pharmaceutical 
company must file the NDA with the FDA for drug marketing ap-
proval.86  This application must contain reports of the sponsor’s in-
vestigations of the drug product and sufficient information about the 
drug which the sponsor believes is pertinent to the evaluation of the 
application.87  The FDA maintains specific guidance documents on 
the format and content of the applications.88  All data and informa-
tion on safety and effectiveness submitted in an application may be 
disclosed to the public upon request unless the FDA finds that ex-
traordinary circumstances exist.89 
While the FDCA provides the FDA with 180 days to act on the 
NDA,90 taking into account delays and informational requests, the 
FDA averages thirty months to review a NDA.91  All things considered, 
the entire drug approval process averages twelve years.92  Only about 
eleven percent of drugs evaluated in Phase I—and only six percent of 
cancer drugs—ultimately are approved by the FDA; the others either 
prove too toxic or do not work.93  Drug companies pay for the cost of 
all clinical trials, and by the time a potential new drug reaches the 
market, drug companies claim the product has cost nearly a billion 
dollars in development.94  However, pharmaceutical companies’ fig-
ures for cost of development have been disputed on the grounds that 
their calculations are inflated to justify charging higher prices and 
that in the end industry profits far exceed the costs of development.95 
E. Exceptions to Current Approval Procedure 
FDA programs for expanded access to medical treatment origi-
nated out of the AIDS epidemic in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  By 
 86 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2007). 
 87 Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000); see Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213 (noting 
that supporting information may contain over 100,000 pages of documentation). 
 88 21 C.F.R. § 314.50. 
 89 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1). 
 90 Id. § 355(c)(1). 
 91 Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Okie, supra note 55, at 439. 
 94 Joseph DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development 
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 181 (2003). 
 95 MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1, 51 (2004).  Angell suggests that included in the cost of 
research and development are the cost of marketing activities.  Id. at 156–172.  Com-
pare RICHARD EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1, 165 (Yale Univ. Press 2006). 
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this time, AIDS had contributed to over 200,000 deaths in the United 
States and remained one of the leading causes of death among mid-
dle aged men and women.96  The gravity and speed of this epidemic, 
along with its strong advocacy organizations, pressured the FDA to 
expedite access to experimental drugs for what was then a terminal, 
rather than chronic, disease.97  The FDA implemented two main pol-
icy changes: the compassionate-use programs for investigational new 
drugs and the fast-track program. 
1. Compassionate-Use Program 
Acknowledging the lengthy timeframe of the drug approval 
process, the FDA has created compassionate-use provisions to expe-
dite access98 to promising new drugs to terminally ill patients who do 
not qualify for clinical trials.99  To qualify for the compassionate-use 
exception, the following criteria must be met: (1) the drug must be 
“intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening illness”;100 
(2) there must be “no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or 
other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the in-
tended patient population”;101 (3) the drug must be “under investiga-
tion in a controlled clinical trial under an IND in effect for the trial,” 
or all clinical trials must have been completed;102 and (4) the sponsor 
of the controlled clinical trial must be “actively pursuing marketing 
approval of the investigational drug.”103  Hence, availability of the ex-
ception depends on the type of illness and stage of the drug approval 
process. 
 96 Anne Rochell, AIDS Deaths in U.S. Top 200,000, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 
29, 1993, at A1; see also Richard Selik et al., HIV Infection as Leading Cause of Death 
Among Young Adults in U.S. Cities and States, 270 JAMA 2991, 2992 (1993) (total U.S. 
deaths attributable to AIDS is 143,653 in 1990). 
 97 Philip J. Hilts, How the AIDS Crisis Made Drug Regulators Speed Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 24, 1989, at D5. 
 98 See Jerome Groopman, The Right to Trial; Should Dying Patients Have Access to 
Experimental Drugs?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 40, 46, for an example of the 
compassionate-use provision in practice.  The drug Iressa was given to 24,000 lung-
cancer patients while still an experimental drug after a Phase II trial showed promis-
ing results.  Id.  Unfortunately, Iressa was never approved by the FDA when subjects 
failed to show improvements in Phase III clinical trials.  Id. 
 99 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (2008). 
 100 Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(i). 
 101 Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(ii); see also Groopman, supra note 98, at 46 (explaining one 
instance where a patient was denied use of an experimental brain tumor drug be-
cause the patient had refused to undergo radiation therapy which is the standard 
treatment for the condition). 
 102 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1)(iii). 
 103 Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iv). 
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Erring on the side of consumer protection, even expedited ac-
cess is administered conservatively.  Drugs will most likely be made 
available only in Phase III of the process or if all clinical trials have 
been completed.104  In appropriate and rare circumstances, a drug 
may be made available prior to Phase III, but never earlier than post-
Phase II; however, this allowance is only warranted with an immediate 
life-threatening disease when all treatment options have been ex-
hausted.105  The FDA Commissioner retains the discretion to deny a 
request for compassionate-use.106  This discretion may be employed if 
the available scientific evidence fails to show the drug is effective for 
its intended use or provides reasonable grounds which indicate the 
patient would be exposed to an unreasonable and significant addi-
tional risk of illness.107 
The law prohibits the drug sponsor from profiting on compas-
sionate-use of experimental drugs, restricting recovery to the cost of 
manufacture, research, development, and handling of investigational 
drugs.108  Thus, pharmaceutical companies have little motivation to 
comply with drug requests from expanded use programs and many 
have refused involvement, fearing that compassionate-use programs 
will interfere with clinical trials and ultimately negatively impact drug 
approval.109 
2. Fast-Track Program 
The FDA designed the fast-track program to facilitate develop-
ment and expedite review of new drugs for serious illnesses.110  To 
this end, the program encourages early and ongoing consultation 
and communication between the FDA and the drug companies—
both before clinical testing on humans and after Phase I testing—to 
improve the efficiency of the process.111  Under the fast-track provi-
sions, the FDA may approve drugs after Phase II if results appear 
promising.112  FDA approval is based on the agency making a medical 
risk-benefit judgment considering the availability of other therapies 
 104 Id. § 312.34(a). 
 105 Id. § 312.34(a). 
 106 Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(i)(A)–(B). 
 107 Id. 
 108 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3) (2008). 
 109 Groopman, supra note 98, at 45–46, 47. 
 110 Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula-
tions; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Ill-
nesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,515, 41,516 (1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 314). 
 111 21 C.F.R. § 312.82 (2008). 
 112 Id. § 312.83. 
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and the severity of the disease.113  Finally, if approval is granted, the 
FDA may require the sponsor to conduct post-marketing, Phase IV, 
studies to evaluate further the drug’s risks, benefits, and optimal 
114 
As a result of the fast-track program, the drug zidovudine, AZT, 
was the first drug approved to treat the AIDS virus, and in record 
time.115  Approval of treatment protocol took five days and marketing 
approval post-Phase II took only 107 days due to well-controlled and 
well-executed clinical trials.116  The total drug approval time was 
shortened from eight years to two years.117  Additionally, under the 
compassionate-use program, AZT, during its development, was dis-
tributed to more than 4000 patients while the marketing application
being pulled together by the sponsor and reviewed by the FDA.118 
Despite this success, the reaction to promoting early and wider 
access to experimental drugs was mixed, especially within the AIDS 
community.  Some researchers feared that earlier availability of 
drugs, without full testing on safety and efficacy, was risky and detri-
mental to patients and the pursuit of a cure.119  The pharmaceutical 
companies were equally unenthusiastic about the expanded use pro-
grams, arguing that drugs needed to be further tested before apply-
ing for an IND.120  Following the first year of the program, the ex-
panded access programs were labeled a “failure” and a “sham” for 
their inability to facilitate any potential drugs to attack AIDS di-
rectly.121  Only one sponsor had applied for and received approval for 
a treatment IND for a HIV-related drug.122  Even though physicians 
 113 Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula-
tions; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Ill-
nesses, 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,523; 21 C.F.R. § 312.84. 
 114 Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula-
tions; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Ill-
nesses, 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,517; 21 C.F.R. § 312.85. 
 115 Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula-
tions; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Ill-
nesses, 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,519. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 41,520. 
 119 Hilts, supra note 97, at D5. 
 120 Philip Boffey, New Initiative to Speed AIDS Drugs Is Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
1988, at C1. 
 121 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS 
EPIDEMIC 50 (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N REPORT]; Boffey, supra note 
120, at C1. 
 122 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 121, at 50. 
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 well as fear of increased susceptibility to li-
ability suits.124 
III. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE FO  DEVELOPMENT DRUGS V. 
VON ESCHENBACH 
A. ion of Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Development 
 
and the terminally ill sought medication, pharmaceutical companies 
hesitated to release their drugs.123  Drug companies’ lack of participa-
tion in the programs stemmed from their concern about disruptions 
in their clinical trials, as
R BETTER ACCESS TO
Format
Drugs 
Alliance is a non-profit organization consisting of terminally ill 
patients and their supporters whose main mission is to “help cancer 
patients and others with life threatening illnesses.”125  Frank Bur-
roughs founded Alliance in 2001, naming the foundation after his 
daughter, Abigail, who lost her life to terminal cancer.126  Prior to her 
death, Abigail had exhausted all of the FDA-approved treatment op-
tions available.127  Her physician was encouraged by a new unap-
proved drug which he believed showed a good response in early clin-
ical trials, and he recommended experimenting with such usage.128  
Abigail did not qualify for the clinical trials of the new drug, and the 
drug company could not provide her with the drug through the 
compassionate-use program.129  In her memory, Alliance has sought 
to assist terminally ill patients in gaining access to experimental drugs 
before efficacy has been shown in clinical trials by lobbying for con-
 123 Id. 
 124 Boffey, supra note 119, at C1. 
 125 Abigail Alliance for Access to Development Drugs, The Abigail Alliance Mis-
sion, http://abigail-alliance.org/mission.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 126 Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle 
an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION, Sept. 2007, at 25, available at http:// 
abigail-alliance.org/LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 26. 
 129 Id.  Abigail Burroughs was seeking access to the drug Erbitux, manufactured by 
ImClone Systems.  Id.  ImClone filed their original request for approval at the FDA in 
2001; however, the FDA determined that the application could not be reviewed since 
the clinical data was inadequate: “half of the patients studied had not failed the ap-
proved treatments for colon cancer and important information about safety and ef-
fectiveness of Erbitux in a portion of the remaining patients was missing.”  Press Re-
lease, FDA, FDA Approves Erbitux for Colorectal Cancer (Feb. 12, 2004) (available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2004/NEW01024.html).  In 2003, ImClone 
resubmitted results from a well-run trial and supplemented missing information 
from their original 2001 request.  Id.  The FDA approved Erbitux on February 12, 
2004.  Id. 
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ublic on the need to increase 
access to potential life-saving drugs.130 
e a risk-
bene
gressional change, protesting the FDA, encouraging cooperation with 
drug companies, and educating the p
1. Procedural History 
In furtherance of its mission, Alliance submitted a proposal to 
the FDA in January 2003 for new regulations that would make ex-
perimental drugs available after Phase I trials to terminally ill patients 
who were not selected for clinical trials.131  In so doing, Alliance at-
tempted to expand the FDA’s extant compassionate-use program that 
allows investigational drugs to be accessed after Phase III, and with 
some exceptions, after Phase II.132  The FDA rejected Alliance’s peti-
tion, concluding that the proposal would upset the appropriate bal-
ance the FDA sought to maintain.133  The FDA noted that “in the 
realm of reviewing medical products to treat serious and life-
threatening diseases, there is inevitable tension between early avail-
ability of products to patients, especially patients with refractory dis-
ease,134 and the need to obtain sufficient data to provide a reasonable 
expectation of benefit and lack of excessive harm.”135  Accordingly, 
the FDA concluded that increasing patient availability befor
fit analysis could be performed would be detrimental.136 
Such a response was unsurprising considering the context in 
which the FDA reviewed Alliance’s proposal.  In 2003, product liabil-
ity lawsuits were filed against Merck because of the dangerous side-
effects of the drug Vioxx, subjecting the FDA to enormous criticism 
for allowing an unsafe product to the market.137  The FDA approved 
Vioxx in 1999 for treatment of pain and inflammation associated with 
arthritis.138  However, after being on the market for a few years, Vioxx 
 
 130 Kovach, supra note 126, at 29. 
 131 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 
3 IS 29594, at **3–4 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004). 
readily 
ess to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
ess to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
n Paradigm: The Search for 
3 (2006). 
 supra note 137, at 158, 163–64. 
0 -1601, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEX
 132 See supra notes 89–96. 
 133 Abigail Alliance, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *4. 
 134 A refractory disease is defined as a disease which is obstinate or not 
yielding to treatment.  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1542 (28th ed. 2005). 
 135 Abigail Alliance for Better Acc
445 F.3d 470, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 136 Abigail Alliance for Better Acc
495 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 137 Alex Berenson, Merck Asks for a Dismissal in First of Suits over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2005, at C5; Walter T. Champion, The Vioxx Litigatio
Smoking Guns, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 157, 167, 17
 138 Champion,
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ver increasing the speed by which drugs entered the 
mark
the FDA’s policy on restricting access to unapproved drugs is ration-
 
was shown to cause adverse cardiovascular side effects.139  While 
Merck pulled Vioxx from distribution in 2004, skepticism increased 
as to how such a dangerous drug could reach the market, leaving 
questions about the state and effectiveness of clinical trials.140  Ironi-
cally, Alliance’s timing for promoting early access to experimental 
drugs coincided with a movement that focused on promoting the 
safety of drugs o
et. 
It was against this background that Alliance filed a citizen peti-
tion,141 pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30, challenging the FDA’s policy 
prohibiting the distribution of experimental drugs to terminally ill 
patients.142  The FDA acknowledged but did not respond to the peti-
tion, which allowed Alliance the right to judicial review.143  Conse-
quently, Alliance filed suit against the FDA Commissioner and the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to enjoin 
the FDA from forbidding the sale and distribution of post–Phase I 
experimental drugs.144  The U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because 
Alliance was seeking to establish a new constitutional right to life not 
explicitly granted in the due process clause.145  The court acknowl-
edged the nation’s focus on preserving life but did not accept Alli-
ance’s argument that the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to 
refuse life-saving medical treatment146 created a “complementary 
right to choose life by obtaining potentially life-saving medication.”147  
Without an established fundamental due process right, the court ex-
amined Alliance’s claims under rational basis review and held that 
 139 Id. at 164. 
 140 Id. at 166–67. 
 141 A Citizen Petition is a means for interested parties to initiate administrative 
proceedings in order to petition the Commissioner of the FDA to issue, amend, or 
revoke a regulation or refrain from taking a certain action.  21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a) 
(2008).  The format and contents of the petition are governed the rules set out in 21 
C.F.R. § 10.30 (2008).  The Commissioner of the FDA has the authority to grant or 
deny petitions and must respond to each petitioner within 180 days of receipt.  Id. § 
10.30(e)(1)–(3). 
 142 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
445 F.3d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 473–74. 
 145 Id. at 474. 
 146 See Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding 
the legal principle that individuals have a right to refuse medical treatment). 
 147 Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 474–75. 
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ally related to the legitimate governmental interest of protecting pub-
lic health.148 
Alliance appealed this dismissal and in May 2006 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the motion 
to dismiss de novo.149  On appeal, the issue was whether fundamental 
due process rights to privacy, liberty, and life include the right of 
terminally ill patients who are informed and acting on their doctor’s 
advice to obtain potentially life-saving, unapproved drugs when no 
alternative exists.150  In a two-to-one decision, the court overturned 
the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that 
due process protects the rights of terminally ill patients to have access 
to post–Phase I investigational drugs.151  In arriving at this decision, 
the court based its analysis on whether such a right was part of our 
nation’s “history and legal tradition” and “implicit in the concept of 
liberty.”152 
The court created a careful and narrow description of the fun-
damental right: “the right of terminally ill patients, acting on a doc-
tor’s advice, to obtain potentially life-saving medication when no al-
ternative treatment approved by the government is available.”153  The 
court looked to three common law doctrines to show a right to self-
preservation in our nation’s history and legal tradition—the doctrine 
of necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the 
right to self-defense.154  The court recognized in Anglo-American his-
tory a tradition that “when a person is faced with death, necessity of-
ten warrants extraordinary measures not otherwise justified.”155  Deny-
ing patients access to life-saving drugs, then, would violate this right 
of self-preservation.156  Additionally, the court examined the history of 
drug regulation, concluding that regulating access to new drugs was 
recent in our nation’s history.157  The court supported its position of 
allowing access by stating that restricting access was not part of Amer-
ica’s tradition, since drugs were not regulated until 1906 and it was 
 148 Id. at 475. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 477–78. 
 151 Id. at 486. 
 152 Id. at 476–77. 
 153 Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 478. 
 154 Id. at 480–81. 
 155 Id. at 480. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 481. 
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not until 1962 that access to new drugs required a showing of effi-
cacy.158 
The court not only found the right to experimental drugs estab-
lished in our nation’s history and legal tradition but concluded that 
such a right was “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”159  The 
court held that the right to access unapproved drugs was implied in 
the Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, which 
held that the due process clause protects a person’s right to refuse 
life-saving medical treatment.160  The court noted that this holding 
created a due process right to “make an informed decision to engage 
in conduct, by withdrawing treatment, that will cause one’s death.”161  
Applying the due process rights established in Cruzan to Alliance’s 
case, the court found that the “logical corollary is that an individual 
must also be free to decide for herself whether to assume any known 
or unknown risks of taking a medication that might prolong her 
life.”162  The court remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine whether the FDA’s policy would pass strict scrutiny.163 
On March 1, 2007, the FDA appealed the decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the court agreed to 
hear the case en banc.164  By August 2007, the court of appeals va-
cated its prior decision in an eight-to-two vote concluding “that there 
is no fundamental right ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition’ of access to experimental drugs for the terminally ill.”165  In 
order for Alliance to succeed on its claim, the court found it needed 
to show that there was both a tradition of access to drugs that have 
not been proven effective and a tradition of access to drugs that have 
not been proven safe.166  It was not adequate only to show that the 
government did not have a long history of regulating drugs in a gen-
eral sense.167  In its analysis, the court examined the history of drug 
regulation since 1736 and concluded that Alliance had ignored the 
nation’s history of drug safety regulation prior to governmental acts 
 158 Id. at 481–82. 
 159 Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 483–84 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937)). 
 160 Id. at 484. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 486. 
 164 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 165 Id. at 697 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)). 
 166 Id. at 703. 
 167 Id. 
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for drug regulation.168  While the court conceded that a lack of gov-
ernmental interference throughout history may be some evidence 
that a right is deeply rooted, the court noted that this lack of regula-
tion was insufficient on its own.169 
Furthermore, the court rejected Alliance’s reliance on the three 
common law doctrines of self-preservation.170  The court noted that 
Alliance offered little detail about how the common law doctrine of 
necessity applied to its case.171  Rather, the court acknowledged that 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of this doctrine in Oakland Cannabis 
Buyer’s Co-op172 left almost no leeway for the doctrine of necessity to 
override the FDCA.173  In Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, the Supreme 
Court rejected an argument that medical necessity could be read into 
a statute which explicitly denied access to drugs, holding that the de-
fense of necessity is invalid if Congress has statutorily limited its ap-
plication.174  In Abigail Alliance, Congress, through the FDCA, limited 
access to experimental drugs; consequently, the common law doc-
trine of necessity could not override the legislature’s value judg-
ment.175  Additionally, the court abandoned the argument based on 
the tort of intentional interference with life-saving efforts, stating that 
such an action requires that aid be given to a person that is necessary 
to secure that person’s bodily integrity.176  There is no application of 
this principle to Alliance’s case because the drugs have not been 
proven to be safe or effective so as to be necessary to save one’s life.177  
Lastly, the court rejected Alliance’s self-defense argument by refusing 
to accept that this case was about using reasonable force to defend 
oneself or about receiving access to medical treatment.178  The court’s 
decision turned on the fact that Alliance’s patients could not “de-
fend” themselves from harm by taking life-saving drugs with only the 
 168 Id. at 704•05. 
 169 Id. at 706. 
 170 Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 707–10. 
 171 Id. at 707–08. 
 172 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (dis-
cussing the legality of providing marijuana to patients in violation of the Controlled 
Substance Act). 
 173 Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 708 (noting that in Oakland the Supreme Court 
held that Congress may limit or even eliminate a necessity defense that would under 
normal circumstances be available). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 710. 
 178 Id. 
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potential for therapeutic effect.179  The court found that Alliance was 
not arguing for the right of patients to defend themselves against a 
disease or harm, but only for the right to assume an enormous risk.180 
The court found no fundamental right to access experimental 
drugs; hence, it applied a rational basis review to the government’s 
regulations.181  It was evident to the court that the government had a 
rational basis for guaranteeing “a scientifically and medically accept-
able level of knowledge about the risks and benefits of such a drug; 
the FDA’s policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is ration-
ally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, in-
cluding the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with un-
known therapeutic effects.”182 
While the August 2007 decision of the court of appeals was a 
roadblock for Alliance’s effort, the group subsequently filed a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari at the Supreme Court.183  Even though cer-
tiorari was denied in early 2008, Alliance remains firmly committed to 
its cause, decreeing that the organization will continue to pursue the 
right to access investigational drugs in other federal circuit courts of 
appeal and, if necessary, in Congress.184 
IV. AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY: PHARMACEUTICAL  
COMPANIES LACK INCENTIVES TO VOLUNTARILY PROVIDE ACCESS TO 
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS. 
Even with a favorable verdict, Alliance will not be successful in 
accomplishing access to post–Phase I experimental drugs through lit-
igation.  Pharmaceutical companies are private corporations, not 
state actors.185  So, while the Constitution may require the removal of 
 179 Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710. 
 180 Id. at 710. 
 181 Id. at 713. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. 
Sept. 28, 2008) (No. 07-444). 
 184 Press Release, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, Abi-
gail Alliance Will Appeal D.C. Circuit Court Decision (Aug. 22, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
 185 A state actor is a person or entity acting on behalf of the government and is 
therefore subject to the U.S. Bill of Rights.  Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 929–30 (1982).  The Constitution does not grant affirmative rights but only pro-
tects individuals from the government infringing on constitutional rights not private 
individuals.  Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195 
(1989).  Private individual entities have been converted to state actors when there is a 
close nexus between the government and the private sector, when the government 
OCHS (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:21:59 PM 
2009] COMMENT 581 
 
a government-imposed barrier such as a federal regulation to drug 
access, such a decision does not compel a private pharmaceutical 
company to grant such access, absent some statute.  Thus, success in 
removing the legal barrier is only the first, albeit necessary step, and 
will not conclude the fight—Alliance will then have to convince drug 
companies to actually release the drugs or obtain passage of legisla-
tion commanding access.  Such an outcome is unlikely.  When the 
cost, practical infeasibilities, potential tort claim liability, ethical hur-
dles, and lack of infrastructure for such a program are considered, 
pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to provide experimental 
drugs unless drastic changes and accommodations are provided to 
protect them. 
A. Access to Experimental Drugs Is Practically Infeasible 
Assuming arguendo that drug manufacturers could voluntarily 
provide access to experimental drugs, they currently lack incentive to 
do so.  The dynamics of the drug approval and development process 
make providing drugs early in the testing state practically infeasible.  
The main factors that control the incentives for providing access to 
these drugs are the fear of tort litigation, threat to clinical trials, lim-
its to manufacturing capacity, possibility of harmful—or even dead-
ly—effects of the drugs, and the lack of financial benefit. 
1. Fear of Increased Tort Litigation 
Every drug manufacturer has an ever-present concern for the 
possibility of tort litigation even after a new drug has been approved 
and has been on the market.186  With unapproved, experimental 
drugs, the uncertainty of the drug’s safety and effectiveness along 
with the possibility of unknown side effects creates a legitimate fear 
for manufacturers.  Informed consent claims are the routine type of 
litigation that occurs with regard to unapproved drugs.187  However, 
even these claims can be coupled with additional allegations under 
theories of strict product liability, failure to warn, negligence, and 
coerces, controls or encourages a private actor, when the action the private actor 
performs is traditionally a government function, or when the government and pri-
vate actor participate in joint activity.  See generally Lugar, 457 U.S. 922; Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 
(1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 186 See Barnaby J. Feder, Federal Panel Consolidates Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2005, at C1, for an example of volume and cost of tort litigation when issues of safety 
and effectiveness arise with an approved medication such as Vioxx. 
 187 Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 40, 41 (2003). 
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fraud.188  The implications of such litigation are obvious and severe: 
the cost of research and development will drastically increase and 
drug companies will have a disincentive to produce new cancer 
drugs.189 
a. Informed Consent 
Informed consent represents a crucial safeguard protecting hu-
man subjects participating in clinical trials for unapproved drugs.190  
All clinical trial investigators are required to obtain the consent of 
participants after providing a sufficient opportunity for considera-
tion.191  Information provided to the participant is required to be in 
clear, comprehendible language, and consent must contain both “a 
description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts” and a 
description of benefits to the subject which may reasonably be ex-
pected.192  Additionally, investigators must provide a statement of the 
purpose and expectation of the study and a description of the trial 
procedures; for instance, whether the trial is a blind, randomized tri-
al.193  These particular facts are crucial to participants’ understanding 
that the study is not medical treatment but an experimental study.  
No informed consent may include any exculpatory language which 
waives or appears to release the sponsor from any liability for negli-
gence.194  Ultimately, informed consent seeks to ensure that each sub-
ject is competent to understand the information provided and willing 
to accept participation in investigational studies voluntarily without 
any undue influences.195 
While its aim is to protect subjects in clinical trials, informed 
consent fails to be effective when a subject’s understanding of his ac-
cess to the experimental drug is tainted by therapeutic misconcep-
tion.196  Therapeutic misconception occurs when a subject regardless 
of the information provided concerning the study nonetheless be-
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 44. 
 190 See 21 C.F.R. § 50 (2007). 
 191 Id. § 50.20. 
 192 Id. § 50.20, 50.25(a). 
 193 Id. § 50.25(a). 
 194 Id. § 50.20. 
 195 Sarah Hewlett, Consent to Clinical Research—Adequately Voluntary or Substantially 
Influenced?, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 232, 232 (1996). 
 196 Paul S. Applebaum et al., False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research and the 
Therapeutic Misconception, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT. 20, 20 (1987). 
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lieves that the research project will benefit him directly.197  A key fac-
tor in informed consent for subjects is the understanding that con-
sent to use experimental drugs in a clinical setting is not the same as 
treatment.198  Subjects under this misapprehension deny the possibil-
ity that there could be any disadvantages to participating in a study 
on experimental drugs.199  Research shows that as many as seventy 
percent of subjects in clinical trials suffer from therapeutic miscon-
ception, believing that their participation is medical treatment for 
their personal needs.200  Such a high percentage among subjects is 
substantiated when participants are questioned regarding their moti-
vation for entering clinical trials.  Instead of indicating a desire to as-
sist in research for the good of cancer patients as a whole, most sub-
jects indicate their participation in a trial was based on a desire to get 
advanced medical treatment, the hope of possibly benefiting in the 
absence of alternatives, and blind trust in their doctors’ recommen-
dation.201  With this mindset, subjects do not pay particular heed to 
the information provided through the informed consent process.202  
In fact, many participants decide to participate in a clinical trial be-
fore even learning about the design of the study or signing the 
form.203 
This misalignment of investigators’ goals and participants’ ex-
pectations regarding involvement in clinical trials creates a ripe set-
ting for litigation.  A current example of an informed consent claim 
derived from therapeutic misconception is the lawsuit sparked by the 
death of Jesse Gelsinger.204  In September 1999, eighteen-year-old 
Jesse Gelsinger died from a reaction to a Phase I gene therapy treat-
ment at the University of Pennsylvania’s Institute of Human Gene 
Therapy.205  Gelsinger suffered from a rare genetic illness which seri-
ously affected his liver.206  While his illness had left him hospitalized 
 197 Paul S. Applebaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path toward Avoid-
ing the Therapeutic Misconception, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 22, 22–23 (2002). 
 198 Gail E. Henderson et al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic 
Misconception, 4 PLOSMED. 1735, 1735 (2007), available at http://medicine.plos 
journals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0040324. 
 199 Applebaum, supra note 197, at 22. 
 200 Id. at 23. 
 201 Kass et al., supra note 70, at 25–26. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Mello et al., supra note 187, at 41. 
 205 Larry Thompson, Human Gene Therapy: Harsh Lessons, High Hopes, FDA 
CONSUMER, Sept.–Oct. 2000, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/ 
500_gene.html. 
 206 Id. 
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and seriously ill for many years, Gelsinger had been able to control 
his disease with diet and pills and lived as a normal, active teenager.207  
Although Gelsinger was considered healthy, Gelsinger’s father en-
couraged him to participate in a Phase I study hoping there would be 
therapeutic benefit from the new therapy.208  Four days after receiving 
the experimental treatment, Gelsinger died, but not from his dis-
ease—the experimental therapy caused multiple system failure.209  
Despite signing the informed consent form, the Gelsinger family, af-
ter Jesse’s death, pursued an action with claims of informed consent, 
product liability, and fraud.210  The Gelsingers claimed that the inves-
tigators failed to reveal information regarding the risks of the trial 
and that the principal investigator had a financial conflict of interest 
with the sponsor.211  In the end, both parties reached a confidential 
settlement agreement in November 2000.212 
The Gelsingers’ lawsuit illustrates the possible issues created with 
informed consent and therapeutic misconception.  Participants who 
refuse to understand the fundamental risk of experimental studies 
are left disappointed, angry, and confused when the trials do not 
produce an expected health benefit.  This expectation, although un-
realistic, has the potential to expose drug sponsors to increased tort 
litigation regardless of informed consent. 
b. Application of Informed Consent to Alliance 
The threat of informed consent litigation discourages pharma-
ceutical companies from allowing open access to experimental drugs.  
Even though Alliance’s patients would not be clinical trial subjects, 
these patients would still be required to give informed consent for 
use of experimental drugs.  Considering the novelty of providing in-
vestigational drugs outside of the clinical trial context, the dynamics 
of informed consent in clinical trials provides the best guide to assess 
how informed consent may or may not work in countering tort litiga-
 207 Id. 
 208 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Teenager’s Death Is Shaking Up Field of Human Gene-Therapy 
Experiments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at A20. 
 209 Thompson, supra note 205. 
 210 Mello et al., supra note 187, at 41. It is important to note that the Gelsinger 
family’s addition of a fraud claim exposed the pharmaceutical company to the possi-
bility of increased damage awards.  Id.  Punitive damages occur in less than 1.5% of 
medical malpractice verdicts and approximately five percent of plaintiff trial wins 
overall.  Id. at 42.  However, punitive damage awards are exceptionally common 
among fraud claims, occurring in about one-fourth of verdicts for plaintiff.  Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
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tion and setting proper expectations for Alliance’s members.  Clinical 
trial participants are a logical corollary to Alliance’s members because 
the patients are voluntary and there will necessarily be limited knowl-
edge about the drugs.  Hence, one issue that arises is whether post–
Phase I informed consent can ever even be given.  With limited know-
ledge about the side-effects and possibly no information about effec-
tiveness, the quantity and quality of information provided might not 
afford realistic or adequate expectations for the patient to make a 
proper decision to use the experimental drugs. 
Therapeutic misconception may eliminate a patient’s ability to 
make a knowing and voluntary decision to use investigational drugs 
even if there is informed consent.  Similar to clinical trials, subjects 
receiving access to experimental medications are not receiving treat-
ment.  While they will not be exposed to the implications of blind, 
randomized studies, patients will still be receiving drugs which have 
not been proven effective, whose dosage has not been perfected, and 
whose side-effects are unknown.  In a sense, while not officially par-
ticipating in a trial, the patients are still “test rats” for the investiga-
tional drug.  Studies of clinical trials have shown that patients who 
suffer from terminal illness are more likely to view taking experimen-
tal drugs as treatment and less likely to weigh all risks, benefits, and 
alternatives.213  Since Alliance represents terminally ill patients who 
have exhausted their options, therapeutic misconception would most 
likely be a factor affecting the validity of its patients’ informed con-
sent and could lead to a “Gelsinger” situation where patients bring 
litigation when their expectation of the “treatment” is not satisfied or 
something tragic happens. 
The possibility of informed consent claims surrounding access to 
experimental drugs provides a disincentive for pharmaceutical com-
panies to allow access to unproven drugs.  Pharmaceutical companies 
will be afforded very little protection from informed consent forms 
and will be left vulnerable to liability.  Regardless of the validity of 
possible litigation, defending any actions translates into money lost.  
This increased cost to research and development could deter drug 
companies either from providing access or, even worse, from pursu-
ing cancer drugs at all. 
 213 Monica H. Schaeffer et al., The Impact of Disease Severity on the Informed Consent 
Process in Clinical Research, 100 AM. J. MED. 261, 267 (1996). 
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2. Access to Experimental Drugs Could Hinder New Drug 
Development 
Phase I access to experimental drugs creates a major concern for 
its effects on new drug development as a whole.  The general fear is 
that accessing experimental drugs will have an impact and influence 
on the success of clinical trials.  Clinical trials—the essential back-
bone of getting safe and effective new drugs to market—could be 
jeopardized with widened access as studies struggle for human subject 
recruitment.  Currently, there is already a shortage of available and 
qualified subjects who may and are willing to participate in trials: only 
three percent of cancer patients in the United States are enrolled in 
clinical trials.214  As discussed, a motivating factor in participation for 
these trials is the ability to access the drugs before they become avail-
able to the general public.215  If available, patients will most likely 
choose access to drugs outside of the clinical study in order to avoid 
the possibility of receiving a placebo in a double-blind, randomized 
trial.216  Additionally, if patients can access these drugs locally from 
their doctor, patients will have less incentive to travel to centers to 
participate in trials.217  A shortage of patients willing to participate in 
studies could further extend the time and resources needed to com-
plete pre-market studies.218  Many cancer organizations, such as the 
National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship219 and the National Breast 
Cancer Coalition,220 have been unwilling to support Alliance’s efforts, 
 214 Groopman, supra note 98, at 47. 
 215 Kass et al., supra note 70, at 25–26. 
 216 Kerry Howley, Dying for Lifesaving Drugs: Will Desperate Patients Destroy the Phar-
maceutical System That Produces Tomorrow’s Treatments?, REASON, Aug. 1, 2007, at 25, 
available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/120763.html. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Okie, supra note 55, at 437. 
 219 The National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship (NCCS) is the oldest survivor-
led cancer advocacy organization in the country, founded in 1986.  NCCS, About 
NCCS, http://www.canceradvocacy.org/about (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).  NCCS ad-
vocates for cancer care and cancer survivors, making its main priority patient educa-
tion.  Id.  “NCCS believes in evidence-based advocacy for systemic changes at the fed-
eral level in how the nation researches, regulates, finances and delivers quality 
cancer care.”  Id. 
 220 The National Breast Cancer Coalition (NBCC) is a nationwide advocacy net-
work consisting of 600 member organizations and 70,000 individual breast cancer 
activists.  National Breast Cancer Coalition, NBCC History, http://www.natlbcc.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45 (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).  
Founded in 1991, the NBCC’s goal is to eradicate breast cancer through promoting 
research and improving access to quality treatment and care.  Id.  Considered one of 
the most influential groups in health policy, NBCC continues to advocate for change 
in public policy, science, and industry “by creating new partnerships, collaborations, 
research funding opportunities and avenues for access to quality care.”  Id. 
OCHS (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:21:59 PM 
2009] COMMENT 587 
 
fearing widening access will undermine these critical clinical studies 
and interfere with the progression of cancer research.221 
Hesitation on the part of pharmaceutical companies to volun-
teer access to new drugs may also be valid; there is the possibility that 
complications or issues which arise with terminally ill users could lat-
er be used against the drug companies in evaluating or halting the 
approval by the FDA.222  Physicians will bear the burden of prescrib-
ing these experimental drugs and attempting to administer the prop-
er dosage and program based on the limited knowledge of risks, con-
traindications, and benefits.223  Since these experimental drugs would 
not be administered in a controlled or regulated environment, any 
outcomes, either beneficial or tragic, could be misleading.224  Appre-
hension arises when patients with different cancers start taking ex-
perimental drugs outside of the clinic trial context; researchers will 
be unable to determine which drugs work for which cancers and be 
unable to account for any outcomes—whether positive or negative.225  
Public sentiment to adverse reactions of drugs outside the clinical en-
vironment could unfairly interfere with the results of a clinical trial, 
possibly forcing the FDA to get involved in the investigation before 
submission of a NDA. 
Overall, any possibility of prolonging or interfering with the 
drug approval process strongly eliminates incentives for pharmaceu-
tical companies to continue with research and development of new 
drugs.  Taking into consideration the rate of approval, costs, and the 
degree of risk, the market for cancer drugs is not as lucrative as it ap-
pears.226  With only a few real blockbuster drugs for cancer treatment, 
drug companies, when faced with a business decision between devel-
 221 See Press Release, National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship, Physician and 
Patient Care Groups Join (Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.canceradvocacy.org 
/news/press/2007/physician-and-patient-care.html; National Breast Cancer Coali-
tion, Alliance’s Petition to the FDA, http://www.stopbreastcancer.org/index. 
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=76&Itemid=180 (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). 
 222 Howley, supra note 216, at 6. 
 223 Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A  New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case 
of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 207 (2007). 
 224 Compassionate Use of Investigational New Drugs: Is the Current Process Effective?: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 102 (2001) (Statement by Dr. 
Robert J. Temple, Associate Director of Medical Policy at the Center for Drug Evalua-
tion and Research) [hereinafter Compassionate Use Hearing] (stating that industry 
concerns raised at the Oncology Drugs Advisory Committee meeting for access to 
experimental drugs were that the “use of an investigational drug in less controlled 
setting, in patients with very advanced disease could lead to adverse reactions that 
might raise difficult to resolve but spurious safety concerns about the drug”). 
 225 Groopman, supra note 98, at 46–47. 
 226 Id. 
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oping a high-risk cancer drug or a new drug for cholesterol, for ex-
ample, may choose to take a conservative approach and accept a fair 
rate of return by developing the cholesterol drug.227  This dilemma 
will only be further aggravated if access to experimental drugs inter-
feres with the clinical trials or it becomes difficult to identify which 
drugs are effective.  There is considerable risk for cancer patients that 
there will be a “shift [in] investment from oncology to other areas 
where the development process is well defined and much less 
risky.”228  If the cancer drug approval process becomes too laborious, 
companies may abandon cancer research all tog
3. Lack of Financial Incentive 
The cost of development and production of new drugs can be 
astronomical for pharmaceutical companies.229  The market for these 
drugs in Phase I will consist strictly of a subset of all terminally ill can-
cer patients, which is estimated at about 565,650 patients a year.230  
The challenge for pharmaceutical companies is to adequately price 
these new drugs to a fairly limited market so that using the drug is 
feasible for the manufacturer and patient.231  Most likely, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and private insurers will not pay for experimental post–
Phase I drugs.232  Health insurers are willing to pay for treatments that 
are proven safe, effective, and medically necessary, but deny interven-
tion coverage for emerging therapies.233 
Hence, Medicaid and private health insurance companies cus-
tomarily include in their policies provisions providing for the denial 
of “experimental” treatment, a term that has varying definitions and 
interpretations.234  The possible ambiguity in the term “experimental” 
has led to recent litigation between insurers and women suffering 
from breast cancer seeking coverage for the “investigational” autolo-
gous bone marrow transplant (ABMT)235 treatment, which had only 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 230 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 231 Groopman, supra note 98, at 46–47. 
 232 Okie, supra note 55, at 440. 
 233 John Cova, A Swift Response to a “Modest” Proposal, 84 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 744, 
744 (1992) (noting that insurers are not responsible for funding clinical research). 
 234 Angela Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB. L. REV. 795, 795–
96 (1994). 
 235 ABMT is an aggressive procedure to treat State IV cancer by which bone mar-
row is extracted from the patient and frozen while the patient undergoes unusually 
high doses of chemotherapy.  Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 
586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990).  When the chemotherapy is complete, the bone marrow is 
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been through Phase II testing.236  Applying contract law, many courts 
have construed the ambiguity of policy language against the insurer 
and many women were successful in receiving coverage for this inter-
vention because courts deemed it to be potentially life-saving medical 
treatment.237  Nonetheless, many courts have sided with the insurance 
company’s denial of ABMT treatment because the intervention quali-
fied as experimental and the policy language was clear.238  Most likely, 
as a result of this litigation, insurance companies will have removed 
all ambiguities in coverage in regards to “experimental” drugs.  Even 
if such ambiguity still exists, courts will potentially be less likely to side 
in favor of a patient when the drug has only been through Phase I 
trials in contrast to ABMT which had completed Phase II.  Addition-
ally, the subsequent FDA denial of Phase III approval of the ABMT 
procedure239 established a strong warning for the courts that drugs 
which have not properly finished testing are still experimental and 
can fail for lack of efficacy.  Considering this progression, it is likely 
that the terminally ill will be forced to pay out of pocket for the ex-
penses of these investigational drugs. 
In addition to a lack of insurance coverage to compensate for 
drug use, if the pharmaceutical companies find it necessary to track 
and monitor these experimental drugs, the additional costs—above 
research and development and clinical trials—might be too high to 
make providing access worthwhile.240  In its complaint, Alliance ar-
gued that the experimental drugs should be able to be sold at a profit 
by the pharmaceutical companies in order to encourage participa-
restored in the patient.  Id.  This treatment requires at least a ten-day hospital stay 
and follow-up medical care costing on average $100,000.  Id.  At the time of the litiga-
tion, ABMT had not been tested in a Phase III study.  Id. 
 236 See infra notes 237–38. 
 237 See, e.g., Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 661, 663 
(D. Md. 1991); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D. 
Conn. 1991); Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 595; Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 
517 N.W.2d 864, 867–69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Waldrip v. Conn. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 
566 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. App. 1990). 
 238 See, e.g., Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 712–13 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 90–92 (5th Cir. 1992); Hasty v. 
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 851 F. Supp. 1250, 1255–60 
(N.D. Ind. 1994). 
 239 For a discussion on why ABMT subsequently failed to prove effective in ran-
domized clinical trials after over 30,000 women had unnecessarily received this dras-
tic treatment, see The Breast Cancer HDCT/Transplant Debacle: Why Did It Happen, and 
Could It Happen Again, 16 ONCOLOGY NEWS INT’L, Sept. 2007, available at  http://www. 
cancernetwork.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleId=201805399. 
 240 Okie, supra note 55, at 440. 
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tion.241  This change would be in direct opposition to the FDA’s cur-
rent regulations regarding “compassionate-use” exceptions that strict-
ly prohibit the companies from making a profit on investigational 
drugs.242  This departure from the current standard embodies Alli-
ance’s belief, and the libertarian perspective, that the terminally ill 
have the right to autonomy, to make personal self-dealing choices 
about their lives and their medical treatment—including whether to 
pay out-of-pocket for access to investigational drugs.243  While Alliance 
advocates for patients’ autonomy to make decisions to pay for investi-
gational drugs, the FDA’s resistance focuses on the patient’s potential 
vulnerability—willingness to sacrifice their savings and over-extend 
their credit for pricey medications which offer no value and possibly 
just false hope.244  However, Alliance argues for the possibility of this 
hope, regardless of its legitimacy, at any cost to the patient.245  Con-
sidering a best-case scenario under Alliance’s plan, the drug compa-
nies would need to find a balance in price between covering their 
costs (not necessarily making a profit) and making the drug afford-
able to the patient.  However, maintaining this balance poses a chal-
lenge for approved, marketable drugs, making it unlikely drug com-
panies will find a price that provides them with an incentive to offer 
access to experimental drugs outside of clinical studies, while making 
the drug affordable to patients of varying incomes. 
4. Limits to Manufacturing Capacity 
Production of new drugs is indirectly dictated by and tailored to 
the FDA’s regulations on drug approval.246  This FDA-centrism247 con-
trols the amount of drugs produced.  Considering the size of clinical 
trials, ranging from a few hundred subjects to a few thousand, 
batches prepared for these studies are particularly small.248  Hence, 
 241 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 242 21 C.F.R. 312.7(d)(3) (2008). 
 243 Brief of Appellant’s Resp. to Appellee’s Pet. for Panel Reh’g and Reh’g En 
Banc at 6–7, Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 700. 
 244 See George J. Annas, Faith(Healing), Hope, and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of 
AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771 (1989), for a discussion that expanding access 
to investigational AIDS medications is bad public policy because it exploits vulner-
able patients who are looking for hope at any cost. 
 245 See infra text accompanying note 259. 
 246 Jeffrey N. Gibbs, State Regulation of Pharmaceutical Clinical Trials, 59 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 265, 265 (2004). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Tom Class, Expanded Access to Unapproved Medical Products: Compassionate Use, 
REG. AFF. FOCUS, May 2006. 
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allowing access to experimental drugs would require a major invest-
ment in resources to increase production for this new market.249  For 
example, ImClone has cited, as its critical roadblock in providing to 
compassionate-use programs the drug Erbitux (the drug Abigail Bur-
roughs was denied), its constraints and limits in the manufacturing 
process for these specialized drugs.250  Due to limited manufacturing 
capacity and lack of out-sourcing facilities, ImClone was forced to 
prioritize drug production and allocate all drugs to clinical trials, 
eventually terminating its participation in any expanded use pro-
gram.251  In order to meet even this limited demand of the clinical tri-
als and the expanded use programs, ImClone built its own facility to 
ensure an adequate supply of the drugs, accepting the risk that Erbi-
tux might never be approved.252 
Drug companies would be reckless to consider increasing pro-
duction of drugs at any cost when the drugs do not qualify as medical 
treatment and have the potential to exacerbate a patient’s condition 
or even cause death.  It is not reasonable to invest in the resources to 
increase manufacturing when there is no evidence that the drug is ef-
fective and ultimately will be financially viable.253  Yet another factor 
to consider is that in the early phases of the approval process drug 
companies are still figuring out how to best manufacture the prod-
uct.254  By rushing this process, the manufacturing of these drugs—
which still only have a six percent chance of FDA approval255—might 
not be optimal both for the patient’s health and for cost efficiencies 
in production for the company. 
5. Access to Experimental Drugs Could Raise Ethical 
Issues for Pharmaceutical Companies 
Providing access to experimental drugs pushes the boundaries 
on ethical issues for both the FDA and pharmaceutical companies.  
Due to the nature and gravity of their business, pharmaceutical com-
 249 Groopman, supra note 98, at 45; see also Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note 
224 (statement by Dr. Robert J. Temple, Associate Director for Medical Policy at the 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) (citing limits to drug supply and the cost 
of increasing such a supply as an industry concern in providing access to investiga-
tional drugs). 
 250 Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note224, at 113–14 (statement by Dr. Samuel 
Waksal, President and CEO of ImClone Systems, Inc.). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 120. 
 253 Class, supra note 248, at 13. 
 254 Okie, supra note 55, at 440. 
 255 See id. at 439. 
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panies have an ethical obligation to provide the highest quality prod-
ucts.  Since the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA, the FDA has ac-
cepted the obligation to responsibly regulate drugs and strengthen its 
identity as a consumer protection agency.256  These obligations can 
conflict with the increasing emphasis on individual autonomy in 
American society and law.257  For instance, Alliance argues that the 
government is too paternalistic, in that terminally ill patients should 
be allowed to accept the greater risk in taking experimental drugs.258  
Alliance strongly believes that 
these decisions depend greatly on the patient’s values and indi-
vidual life circumstances as well as his or her cold assessment of 
the statistical response rates.  Are the last days of a person’s life 
better spent in perhaps a painful struggle against nearly impossi-
ble odds, but with some hope and the conviction that he or she is 
doing everything possible?  Or is it instead better or more noble 
to accept one’s fate and spend the final days saying goodbye and 
hoping passively for a spontaneous remission?  Is a 10% chance of 
living an extra month worth hazarding a risky and painful treat-
ment that will degrade the patient’s remaining life?  Certainly [Al-
liance] does not know the right answers for every patient.  Neither 
. . . does the FDA.259 
Alliance claims that to deny a right to accept a heightened risk can be 
viewed as administering a death sentence to sick patients.260  On the 
other hand, the FDA and drug companies have a duty to protect pa-
tients.  Permitting companies to market drugs without evidence of ef-
ficacy could create “massive opportunity for fraud, involving people 
who are very sick and very desperate.”261  Since unapproved experi-
mental drugs are not medical treatments, distribution of these drugs 
to those who are desperate and dying seems unethical and cruel.  Ar-
guments have been raised that allowing access to experimental drugs 
is bad public policy because it only offers false hopes to the sick, in-
ducing patients to spend energy and money grasping at straws.262 
 256 Annas, supra note 244, at 772. 
 257 JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 48 (2005). 
 258 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 259 Brief of Appellant’s Resp. to Appellee’s Pet. for Panel Reh’g and Reh’g En 
Banc at 7, Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 700. 
 260 Sue Korach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle 
an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION 25 (2007), available at http://abigail-
alliance.org/LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf. 
 261 Okie, supra note 55, at 437. 
 262 Annas, supra note 244, at 785–87. 
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Both views on the ethics of supplying experimental drugs inter-
pret compassion differently.  For patients, compassion means allow-
ing the right to choose to accept a greater risk at the slight chance a 
benefit might be received; for drug companies and the FDA, compas-
sion is not supplying ill patients with promises and hope until a drug 
can be proved safe and effective.263  While there may be no right or 
wrong answer, such considerations will come into play as drug manu-
facturers decide whether to voluntarily provide experimental drugs 
outside of clinical trials, upsetting the current balance between pro-
tecting the safety of individuals and respecting the decision of those 
who are dying. 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
While Alliance has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to achieve its 
goals through the judicial system, legislators are seeking to expand 
access to experimental drugs for Alliance’s terminally ill members 
through proposed amendments to the FDCA.  On November 3, 2005, 
Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced the Access, Compassion, 
Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act (ACCESS) which details 
a transformation in the current FDA drug approval system for termi-
nally ill patients, specifically an expansion on approval of fast-track 
products.264  ACCESS shifts the decision for terminally ill patients to 
take investigational drugs to patients and their physicians, and conse-
quently away from the government.265 
A. ACCESS’s Proposal for a Reformed Drug Access Program for the 
Terminally Ill 
ACCESS proposes to amend the FDCA to expand access to inves-
tigational drugs for seriously ill patients who have exhausted all 
treatment options, maintaining that the current drug approval stan-
dards “deny the benefits of medical progress to seriously ill patients 
who face morbidity or death from their disease.”266  The Act identifies 
numerous roadblocks in the current structure that limit more expe-
dited access to investigational drugs such as the necessity of placebo 
 263 See id. at 792 (“True autonomy requires adequate and accurate information 
upon which to base decisions.  This is simply impossible in the absence of reasonable 
scientific study and properly designed clinical trials.”). 
 264 Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); see 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000). 
 265 Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
 266 Id. § 2. 
OCHS (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:21:59 PM 
594 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:559 
 
controlled studies, failure of compassionate-use programs, over-
reliance on conservative statistical analysis of clinical information 
compared to a clinical evaluation, and the inability of sponsors to in-
teract with the FDA in a prompt manner.267  In response to these hur-
dles, the Act recommends an enhanced multi-tiered drug approval 
process for this specific target group of terminally ill patients.268 
ACCESS seeks to allow companies to market drugs after Phase I 
and II—if approved and with appropriate warnings and controls—
strictly to the seriously ill who have exhausted all available medical 
treatment.269  The bill alleviates the strict requirements of clinical test-
ing for market approval in Phase I and creates a new standard for 
evaluation of an application.270  For a Phase I experimental drug to be 
approved for access, the application must show enough preliminary 
evidence of effectiveness for the FDA to determine “whether the to-
tality of the information available . . . regarding the safety and effec-
tiveness of an investigational drug . . . as compared to the risk of 
morbidity or death from a condition or disease, indicates that a pa-
tient . . . may obtain more benefit than risk if treated with the 
drug.”271  When an application is approved, provided the benefits 
outweigh the risks, the bill requires that as a condition to receiving 
the product a patient must (1) provide written informed consent, (2) 
provide a written waiver of the right to sue the manufacturer, spon-
sor, physician, or institution for any adverse events caused by using 
the drugs, enforceable in both state and federal court, and (3) pro-
vide consent to allow the sponsor to obtain information on their us-
age for support of their drug application.272 
Beyond creating more flexibility in the approval process for 
Phase I drugs and alleviating some drug companies’ concerns, the 
ACCESS Act requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
establish an internal infrastructure to support such a program, and 
more importantly, to create additional regulations regarding clinical 
 267 Id. §§ 2–3. 
 268 Id. §§ 2–3. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. (requiring a sponsor to submit an application which contains data and in-
formation “from completed Phase I clinical investigations and any other non-clinical or 
clinical investigations . . . [which show preliminary evidence of effectiveness] based 
on uncontrolled data such as case histories, information about the pharmacological 
mechanism of action, data from animal and computer models, comparison with his-
torical data, or other preliminary information . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 271 Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 
109th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2005). 
 272 Id. § 3. 
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studies and evaluations.273  For example, ACCESS mandates the for-
mation of an Accelerated Approval Advisory Committee, consisting of 
independent, non-government professionals, to review applications 
and issue recommendations to the Secretary for the purpose of ex-
pediting the approval process.274  Also, Senator Brownback proposes 
an Expanded Access Program that specifically focuses on developing 
a plan to recognize and predict drugs that are likely to have a clinical 
benefit for life-threatening conditions and to make available a public 
list of all drugs under investigation which may be candidates for 
Phase I and II marketing approval.275 
Much more drastic than these two provisions, ACCESS also flatly 
prohibits placebo-only or non-treatment-only controls in clinical trials 
with “respect to any life-threatening condition or disease where rea-
sonably effective approved alternative therapies exist for the specific 
indication.”276  This regulation ensures patients would not be pres-
sured into a controlled clinical environment, where they may or may 
not receive an experimental drug, provided that a reasonable drug 
has been approved for this specific use by the agency in the expanded 
use program.  Finally, in evaluating clinical information, the Act in-
structs the Secretary to give equal weight to clinical judgment and sta-
tistical analysis277 to determine safety and effectiveness, prohibiting 
denial of an application “based solely on the basis of a statistical anal-
ysis or the rigid use of the ninety-five percent confidence level con-
vention.”278 
B. Response to ACCESS by Interest Groups 
Critics have labeled ACCESS as “bad law,” noting many of the 
similar criticisms and concerns identified in Alliance’s proposal and 
 273 Id. §§ 2–6. 
 274 Id. § 3. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. § 4. 
 277 Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 
109th Cong. § 6 (1st Sess. 2005).  The ACCESS Act notes that non-statistical measures 
shall include but are not limited to: clinical evaluation information such as case his-
tory reports, scientific and clinical studies designed to measure or define mecha-
nisms of action or molecular targeting, data from animal and computer models, 
comparisons with historical data, evaluations of the adverse effect of delaying the 
availability of an investigational drug to even a small subpopulation of seriously ill 
patients and scientific, observational, or clinical studies designed and conducted to 
collect well-documented information.  Id. 
 278 Id. § 6. 
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litigation.279  The clinical research community is most alarmed, ques-
tioning the lenient standard of approval for Phase I drugs and the 
sponsor’s confidence in evidence of drug efficacy without random-
ized trials.280  Specifically, there is concern that the Act’s allowance of 
pre-clinical data to be evaluated by a risk-benefit standard may cause 
all drugs to appear promising.281  The Society of Clinical Trials notes 
that sponsors only proceed with drug approval past Phase I if the 
drugs are promising, but the harsh reality is that most cancer drugs 
(indeed, most drugs treating any disease) eventually fail for efficacy 
or safety reasons.282  The general fear is that the terminally ill will be 
faced with broad access to experimental drugs, but in actuality access 
will be gained only to ineffective and harmful drugs without any 
means to qualify these drugs for decision-making purposes.283 
The clinical community has also challenged the bill’s repudia-
tion of the accepted scientific method for testing drugs.284  While crit-
ics concede that the drug approval process is rigorous, history has 
shown that the most reliable data and information is obtained from 
randomized clinical trials.285  Interference with this gold standard of 
testing has the potential to undermine years of medical and scientific 
findings. 
Lastly, critics raise ethical issues regarding ACCESS directed at 
protecting terminally ill patients from coercion and liability assump-
tion.  By permitting marketing approval post–Phase I, drug compa-
nies will be permitted to charge for their experimental drugs.286  
Without any controls on pricing, companies may take advantage of 
vulnerable patients.287  Such susceptibility increases when patients are 
required to assume all liability for risk.288  While allowing a blanket 
waiver of liability is the price to be paid to motivate participation by 
the drug companies, patient advocates are concerned that ACCESS 
 279 Colin Begg et al., The Society for Clinical Trials Opposes US Legislation to Permit 
Marketing of Unproven Medical Therapies for Seriously Ill Patients, 3 CLINICAL TRIALS 154, 
157 (2006). 
 280 Id. at 155–56. 
 281 Id. at 155. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Begg et al., supra note 279, at 155. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution—Choice at Life’s End, 357 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 408, 411 (2007). 
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does not provide the appropriate balance for protection of patient 
rights and interests.289 
On the other hand, the bill has attracted strong supporters and 
advocates for expanding patients’ rights.  Supporters have defended 
the more flexible Phase I approval standard for the terminally ill by 
claiming that time spent in pre-clinical testing does not necessarily 
prevent drug tragedies because doctors and drug companies tend to 
learn more about drugs after approval than before.290  Those who de-
fend ACCESS hold firm to the conviction that it is unethical to ex-
pose seriously ill patients to the potential use of placebo medications 
in a clinical trial.291  Despite this support, currently the ACCESS Act 
has not been enacted.292 
C. FDA Responds with Proposed Expanded Access to Investigational 
Drugs for Treatment Use Rule 
The FDA has initiated its own proposal to expand access to in-
vestigational new drugs for patients with serious life-threatening dis-
eases who lack therapeutic options.293  This proposed rule—the Ex-
panded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use (EAID)—
augments the extant expanded access programs by clarifying and 
amending the existing regulations.294  These regulations work at im-
proving the effectiveness of the existing “compassionate-use” pro-
grams by addressing the inconsistencies in the application process, 
elaborating on the requirements and safeguards in the programs, 
and creating flexibility in the review process on a case-by-case basis.295 
 289 Id. 
 290 Univ. of Texas Anderson Cancer Ctr., Phase I Clinical Trials Program: Improving 
Access to Investigational Drugs, 3 BENCH TO BEDSIDE & BACK, Winter/Spring 2007, at 1. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Kaisernetwork.org, Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report: Lawmakers to Reintro-
duce Bill Legalizing Terminally Ill Patients’ Access to Experimental Medications 
(Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/print_report.cfm? 
DR_ID=46955&dr_cat=3 (last visited Nov. 4, 2008). 
 293 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 
75,147 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 75,149–51. 
The FDA clearly identifies the main goal of this rule to address con-
cerns including inconsistent application of access policies and pro-
grams and inequities in access based on relative sophistication of the 
setting in which a patient is treated or on the patient’s disease or con-
dition.  By describing in detail in the proposed rule the criteria, sub-
mission requirements, and safeguards for the different types of ex-
panded access for treatment uses of investigational drugs, the agency 
seeks to increase awareness and knowledge of expanded use programs 
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The EAID rule mandates three criteria to qualify for the ex-
panded use programs.296  First, the patient must suffer from a serious 
disease or a condition lacking satisfactory therapeutic treatment al-
ternatives.297  While this is consistent with the current regulation, the 
FDA clarifies the “lack of comparable or satisfactory therapeutic al-
ternatives” to mean that the patient has exhausted all available FDA-
approved therapies and has failed to respond to these therapies or is 
intolerant of them.298  In addition, the FDA may require the patient 
to exhaust treatment options not regulated by the FDA if such alter-
natives are supported by compelling literature evidence.299  A second 
criterion for the proposed expanded use program is that the FDA 
“must determine that the potential patient benefit justifies the poten-
tial risks of the treatment use and that those potential risks are not 
unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition to be 
treated.”300  The final criterion states that the FDA must assure that 
providing access to investigational drugs will not interfere with any 
stage of clinical testing.301  With the concern of protecting clinical 
testing, the EAID rule restricts acceptance into the expanded use 
program for any individuals able to participate in a clinical trial, but 
recognizes that participation will not be denied if the patient has 
been rejected from a trial due to their stage of the disease, has an in-
tolerance to the active control in the randomized trial, or has limita-
tions due to geographical location that make participation in a trial 
ssible.302 
While EAID focuses on elaborating on the current expanded use 
programs, the proposed rule makes a drastic concession to propo-
nents of both Alliance’s mission and the ACCESS Act.  The proposed 
regulation fails to require a particular level of safety or effectiveness 
to merit access to an investigational drug, leaving such decisions to be 
and the procedures for obtaining investigational drugs.  Increased 
knowledge and awareness about expanded access options should make 
investigational drugs more available in the appropriate situations. 
Id.  These goals address the weaknesses of “compassionate-use” programs identified 
before Congress.  See Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note 224. 
 296 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 
75,150–51 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 297 Id. at 75,150–51. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 
75,147, 75,153 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
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of the disease and the size of the group.303  The proposal dictates that 
as the seriousness of a patient’s disease increases, access to investiga-
tional drugs which have completed Phase I testing and have been 
supported by preliminary evidence of effectiveness could be in-
creased.304  However, as the patient-group size grows—for example, if 
the expanded use application is submitted on behalf of larger patient 
populations—the FDA will demand a higher level of evidentiary find-
ings for safety and effectiveness.305  Most likely, drugs will have to be 
tested through Phase II or III.306  The EAID regulation creates a me-
chanism for the FDA to balance all the information available—testing 
results on safety and effectiveness, seriousness of the disease, and size 
of the sample group—to come to an individualized decision for each 
submission which responsibly assesses the benefits and risks. 
While patients are given the possibility of increased flexibility for 
the opportunity of gaining access, EAID leaves the practical burden 
of meeting compliance standards for the program on physicians and 
drug companies.307  To initiate the entire process, drug manufactur-
ers or sponsors are obligated to file a detailed submission under the 
expanded access program to qualify its drug for access.308  If ap-
proved, the drugs will be administered by a sponsoring physician or 
“investigator” who is required to report adverse experiences to the 
sponsor, ensure informed consent, obtain Institutional Review Board 
approval, and maintain case histories and drug disposition records.309  
Additionally, the proposal suggests that the FDA has the authority to 
require the sponsor to monitor a patient’s use of an investigational 
drug, if access to this drug is authorized to continue past the rule’s 
limited duration of a single course of therapy.310 
VI. THE BEST PROMISE OF HOPE: FDA’S EXPANDED ACCESS TO 
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT USE RULE 
The success of a program permitting access to investigational 
drugs demands participation and cooperation among Congress, the 
FDA, pharmaceutical companies, physicians, and patients, coupled 
 303 Id. at 75,151. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 75,151–52. 
 308 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 
75,147, 75,152 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. at 75,153. 
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with a compromise on the balance between patient autonomy and 
consumer protection.  Unfortunately, Alliance’s litigation, the 
ACCESS Act, and the proposed EAID rule all miss the mark in this 
respect.  Alliance’s litigation makes large demands on behalf of its 
members without implementation of any infrastructure to support 
the envisioned changes.  On the other hand, the ACCESS Act pro-
vides the necessary structure through practical concessions for liabil-
ity waivers, pricing provisions, and the establishment of committees 
and boards to implement the program.  However, the ACCESS Act’s 
overly lenient approval process and disregard for established clinical 
testing methods make it too controversial to muster the required 
support to get the bill approved.  Although Congress is the proper fo-
rum to address this issue, the proposed EAID rule strikes the desired 
compromise between patient autonomy and consumer protection by 
expanding and clarifying the already existing “compassionate-use” 
programs.  However, maintaining this new balance will still require 
more incentives to encourage drug company participation. 
Ironically, and most likely a result of Alliance’s lobbying, the 
FDA itself is seeking to shift the balance and to formulate a reason-
able compromise, blending aspects of Alliance’s and the ACCESS 
Act’s goals with a more conservative consumer protection approach.  
The FDA is obviously in a precarious position because any change 
opens the agency up for criticism if insidious drug access is allowed.  
Conversely, if the agency does not act quickly enough, it will be criti-
cized for being too restrictive in getting effective drugs to the market.  
Clearly neither perspective—the libertarian or the liberal—will ever 
be totally satisfied; however, if compromise is to be made between 
both perspectives (which is obviously debatable), the FDA has found 
the appropriate compromise by evaluating each expanded access use 
on a case-by-case basis.  By improving on an already established pro-
gram, the FDA’s proposal allows the agency to maintain its role as 
consumer protectors but affords the flexibility—only when all cir-
cumstances align properly—for the FDA to meet the desire of dying 
patients to accept the potential risk of using experimental drugs. 
However, even the FDA admits that its own proposal may be fu-
tile due to its lack of authority to compel drug companies to supply 
investigational drugs to patients.311  Concerns about liability, thera-
peutic misconception, manufacturing capacity, informed consent, 
 311 Id. at 75,150 (“While this proposed rule aims to clarify, and thereby expand, 
the situations in which expanded access to unapproved drugs could be available, un-
der its existing authority, FDA cannot compel a drug manufacturer to provide access 
to investigational drugs for treatment use.”). 
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and pricing are left largely unaddressed.  To make this proposal ef-
fective, revisions must be made to encourage drug company partici-
pation and to further protect patients.  First, the proposal must pro-
vide a safeguard for therapeutic misconception by creating an 
evaluation process whereby the patient is counseled and educated re-
garding the drug and instructed that no personal benefit may be 
gained from its use.  This process should be headed by the FDA or 
Institutional Review Boards, incorporating either the sponsor or the 
physician, and the patient’s comprehension and state of mind regard-
ing their access should be a factor in determining access.  While this 
may be an administrative and logistical burden, this procedural safe-
guard protects patients and should involve the implementation of a 
waiver of liability for sponsors, manufacturers, and physicians who 
encourage participation in the program.  Patients who are demand-
ing the right to assume the risk of experimental drugs must concede 
any claims of liability to make the program effective.  This concession 
is balanced by a patient-protective informed consent process; a liabil-
ity waiver will not be coercive or unethical provided a safeguard is in 
place to counteract therapeutic misconception by balancing the real-
ity of the risk with the possible benefits. 
The EAID proposal also needs to specifically address the pricing 
of experimental drugs through the expanded access program.  The 
provisions of EAID place increased burdens on drug companies, in 
regard to their involvement in the expanded access program, yet fail 
to create any incentives for the drug companies to accept these en-
cumbrances.  The proposal only allows companies to be reimbursed 
for direct and select administrative costs.  Experimental drugs should 
be priced so as to permit pharmaceutical companies to break even on 
their production of the drugs.  This break-even price should include 
the administrative costs of running and monitoring an expanded use 
program, an allocation of production fixed and variable costs, cost of 
delivering investigational drugs, and an allocation of the research 
and development costs.  Additionally, the drug sponsor should incor-
porate into the price a fixed percentage increase on the base costs 
accounting for the historical percentage of losses incurred in its ex-
panded use program from production of drugs which are never util-
ized.  This provision encourages manufacturers to increase produc-
tion for the expanded use programs without the fear of being stuck 
with the financial costs and a stockpile of drugs if the drugs are never 
accepted in the program or if the drugs are subsequently found not 
to be safe and effective.  Obviously, these favorable pricing conces-
sions raise ethical and fairness issues for patients: either only the 
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wealthy will be able to afford the medications or desperate patients 
will be forced to sacrifice their life savings for the hope of some the-
rapeutic benefit.  As part of this comprehensive program, the gov-
ernment must consider practical ways to fund access for patients in 
need.  One suggestion may be to create a common patient pool of 
funds contributed by drug companies, the government, private citi-
zens, and interest groups. 
Finally, the proposed EAID rule needs to address the manufac-
turing capacity lag identified as a problem by pharmaceutical com-
panies in supplying drugs to the current compassionate-use pro-
gram.312  The major roadblock in the current compassionate-use 
program is the time constraints for drug companies to ramp up pro-
duction of new investigational drugs.313  In order to overcome these 
manufacturing-time limitations, the EAID must implement a commit-
tee and process whereby investigational drugs are identified as poten-
tial drugs for compassionate-use.  This would involve increased com-
munication between drug manufacturers and the FDA about the 
sponsor’s progress in clinical trials and pre-emptive discussions with 
scientific and medical experts as to their recommendations.  Early 
identification, coupled with a provision that allows companies to be 
reimbursed through the pricing mechanism for wasted production, 
will help encourage drug companies to start increasing manufactur-
ing capacity as soon as reasonably possible. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The tension between the promotion of safe and effective drugs 
and the demand for faster approval is a natural and inevitable conse-
quence of pre-market drug approval.  Competing interests will con-
tinue to push and pull in opposing directions, while the government, 
fearing the backlash of a Thalidomide-like disaster, hopes to find a 
balance that satisfies and protects both patients and drug companies.  
A perfect balance, of course, may not be achievable, but the closest 
and easiest compromise comes in the FDA’s form of individualized 
exceptions.  The FDA’s proposed EAID rule manages to address and 
attempt to fix the failures in the current compassionate-use program, 
while also expanding the program to allow the possibility of meeting 
Alliance’s demands for post–Phase I access to experimental drugs.  
 312 See Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note 224, at 113–15 (statements from Dr. 
Waskal of ImClone) (stating that manufacturing has been the major roadblock for 
getting drugs to expand access programs since the plants are not equipped to pro-
duce drugs on a larger scale and it takes time to scale up production). 
 313 Id. 
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However, the success of providing increased access to experimental 
drugs will depend on the participation of drug companies, and more 
specifically, tailoring a program to offer enough incentives to drug 
manufacturers while not sacrificing patients’ rights.  Through the 
above-mentioned adaptations to the EAID proposal, the compassion-
ate-use programs will be a success and have the potential to meet 
desperate patients’ needs while being equally advantageous for drug 
companies.  While Alliance’s litigation has been and will continue to 
be futile in gaining access to experimental drugs, Alliance’s dedica-
tion to advocating for their desperate patients might bring relief to 
the terminally ill in the form of a proposal from the FDA. 
